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Abstract 
Prior research shows that underreporting chargeable time has been a concern for 
public accounting firms even though many of these firms have policies and procedures 
that prohibit "eating" time. The purpose of this study is to examine the current state 
of this problem and to provide recommendations to manage the problem more effec-
tively. Practicing public accountants at all professional levels were surveyed to de-
termine the extent, opportunity, ethical perception and perceived benefits of underre-
porting time. The results show that although the majority of the respondents believe 
underreporting time is unethical, the majority of them did not report all of their 
chargeable hours in the prior year. The main reasons for such behavior stem from 
the desire to: (1) receive better periodic performance evaluations, (2) be viewed as 
competent by superiors and (3) receive promotions. 
Introduction 
P ublic accounting firms use time budgets and chargeable hours to make decisions regarding client billings, future budgets, 
personnel evaluations and scheduling. Underre-
porting chargeable time can negatively impact 
such decisions. The policies and procedures 
manuals of many accounting firms indicate that 
underreporting time or "eating time" is an unac-
ceptable practice. For example, the following 
excerpt is from The Way We Do Business. Our 
Code of Conduct (pp. 41-42) published by Coo-
pers & Lybrand LLP: Question? Should I ever 
"eat" hours? Answer. Pressure to eat time may 
be subtle, but even if you feel this pressure, not 
Authors are listed in alphabetical order. Read-
ers with comments or questions are encouraged 
to contact the authors via e-mail. 
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reporting all your time is inherently dishonest. 
Although public accounting firms do not 
consider underreporting time an acceptable prac-
tice, prior research indicates this issue has been a 
problem for management of these firms. The 
purpose of this article is to examine the current 
state of underreporting chargeable time and to 
provide recommendations to mitigate the prob-
lem. Practicing accountants were surveyed to 
determine the extent to which they underreport 
time and to ascertain their beliefs and percep-
tions regarding the underreporting of chargeable 
time. The first section of the paper provides a 
brief overview of the limited research on under-
reporting. Problems of underreporting charge-
able time are summarized in section two. The 
design and results of the study are discussed in 
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section three. Recommendations to reduce un-
derreporting time are discussed in the fourth 
section. The fmal section presents concluding 
comments. 
Prior Research 
The Commission on Auditors' Respon-
sibilities (1977) surveyed local, regional and na-
tional public aq.:ounting firms and found that 
55 % of the respondents underreported charge-
able hours. Lightner, Adams and Lightner 
(1983) surveyed 1500 accountants from three 
national CPA firms in six randomly selected cit-
ies. Their results show that 67 % of the respon-. 
dents had underreported chargeable hours. 
Smith, Hutton and Jordan (1996) surveyed 300 
accountants from local, regional and national 
firms in thirteen different cities and found that 
89 % of the respondents did not report all of their 
chargeable time. Despite the efforts of the pub-
lic accounting firms, the results of prior research 
show unreported time has been a problem for the 
past twenty years. 
Problems of Underreporting 
There are problems for both the CPA 
firm and the individual accountant that result 
from underreporting time. Problems related to 
the firm are highlighted in Coopers and Ly-
brand's The Way We Do Business. Our Code of 
Conduct which lists five specific reasons for re-
porting all chargeable hours: 1) assists in the 
preparation of the budget for the next year; 2) 
actual time can be used in negotiating next year's 
fees; 3) used by management to make business 
and resource decisions; 4) review overall ap-
proach to the current engagement and 5) bill cli-
ent additional fees. Problems related to the indi-
vidual accountant include poor morale and lower 
productivity, which could result in poor evalua-
tions which eventually, will lead to turnover. 
Ultimately, the accountant's problems become 
the firm's problems. 
The economic impact of underreporting 
14 
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is difficult to measure. For example, the type of 
engagement (fixed fee versus cost-plus), the 
firm's ability to assign accountants to other tasks 
for the hours not reported, varying billing rates 
and psychological effects (e.g. turnover, morale, 
productivity) are factors that affect the economic 
magnitude of the problem. While the exact 
magnitude of economic loss from underreporting 
is impossible to measure, "eating time" defi-
nitely affects the profitability of public account-
ing firms. 
Study 
Design and Demographics 
Questionnaires were mailed to a random 
sample of 500 members of the Wisconsin Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants. A total of 
224 responses (44%) were received. Demograph 
ics of the respondents are shown in Table I: 
Table 1 
Demographics of Respondents 
Position 
• Partners 38 % 
• Managers 31 % 
• Seniors 24% 
• Staff 7% 
Area 
• Audit 45% 
• Tax 40% 
• Other 15% 
Gender 
• Female 33% 
• Male 67% 
Professional Experience 
• A verage years 13 
Results 
The Extent of Underreporting 
The participants were asked to provide 
the percentage of their total chargeable time that 
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was unrecorded in the preceding year. Table 2 
presents the extent of underreporting for all re-
spondents by position. The findings show that 
overall 71 % of those responding had underre-
ported chargeable time to some extent during the 
previous year. This finding is consistent with 
findings (67%) from an earlier study (Lightner et 
al. 1983) but inconsistent with the findings 
(89%) of a more recent study (Smith et al. 
1996). For th?se respondents that underreported 
time, the majority of the unrecorded time was 
between 1 % and 10 % of the total hours which 
is consistent with prior research (Lightner et al. 
1983; Smith et al. 1996). 
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ample, Coopers & Lybrand and several other 
firms are communicating to the staff in written 
form that "eating" time is not an acceptable. 
Two, generation X is not willing to "eat" hours. 
The Ability to Underreport Time Successfully 
An accountant's perception as to 
whether he or she can successfully underreport 
time will probably have an impact on his or her 
behavior. Table 3 provides an analysis of the 
perception of the participants in our study. The 
majority (72 %) of the respondents believes they 
can (extremely possible or very possible) under-
. Table 2 
Th E e fU d xtent 0 n erreportmg Ch argea e Ime bl T" 
Percentage of unrecorded chargeable time to 
total time in the precedinR year 
0% 
1 to 4 
5 to 9 
10 to 14 
15 to 19 
20 and over 
The findings of this study are consistent 
with prior research (Lightner et al. 1982; Smtih 
et al. 1996) with one exception. We found that 
staff accountants reported the fewest amount of 
unrecorded hours while the two prior studies 
found that staff accountants reported the highest 
amount. We suggest two possible explanations 
for this finding. One, the staff accountants' 
firms have impressed upon them that underre-
porting time is an unacceptable activity. For ex-
Total Partner Manager Senior Staff 
29% 29.7 30.8 21.8 37.5 
25 25.9 22.2 30.9 25.1 
25 19.9 24.9 29.1 31.2 
14 14.8 14.7 16.4 0 
1.4 1.2 1.5 0 6.2 
5.6 8.5 5.9 1.8 0 
report time successfully. Only I % of the re-
spondents felt that it was not possible to under-
report time. Firms' policies are not sufficient to 
preclude the underreporting of time. 
The Ability to Meet Budget 
Another factor likely to influence the 
underreporting of time is the accountant's per-
ception of their ability to meet budget by re-
A ccoun an s percepl10n 0 t t' f 
Table 3 
fth· bTt t elr a I ny 0 un d errepo Ime success u Iy rtf f I  
Perceived ability to success- Percentage Partner Manager Senior Staff 
fully underreport responding 
Extremely possible 28.4 % 29.8 27.9 29.6 18.7 
Very possible 43.2 40.5 48.5 40.7 43.7 
Somewhat possible 17.6 16.7 13.2 22.2 25 
Slightly possible 9.5 10.7 10.3 7.4 6.3 
Not possible 1.3 2.4 0 0 6.3 
15 
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porting 100 percent of their chargeable time. 
Table 4 shows the participants' responses to this 
question. Half of the respondents stated that 
they felt they could meet budget very or fairly 
often. However, only 12% of the participants 
felt they could meet the budget very often. Over 
one-third felt they could only meet budget occa-
sionally if they reported all their chargeable 
time, and nearly 16% felt they could seldom or 
never meet budg~t. This illustrates the relentless 
cycle of underreporting time. If a budget is re-
ported as being met even though it actually took 
more time, then the future budget will be af-
fected as well, which will perpetuate the prob-
lem. This finding also infers that budgets are. 
not realistic. 
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firms' literature, such as Coopers & Lybrand's 
The Way We Do Business. Our Code of Conduct, 
state that underreporting time is unethical, the 
accountant's belief as to whether underreporting 
is appropriate should affect his or her behavior. 
The respondents were asked to report whether 
they believed underreporting was ethical. Table 
5 provides the responses to this question. While 
only 5 % of subjects approved of underreporting, 
note there are partners who do approve of under-
reporting time. In fact 2.4% strongly approve. 
Thirty percent of the respondents were indiffer-
ent. Nearly two-thirds of respondents disap-
prove of underreporting which is interesting 
since 71 % of the respondents underreported time 
in the previous year. These findings indicate the 
Table 4 
Accountants' perception of their ability to meet budget by reporting 100 percent of chargeable time 
Perceived ability to meet budget when Percentage 
all chargeable time is reported responding 
Never 2.3 % 
Seldom 13.5 
Occasionally 34.2 
Fairly often 37.4 
Very Often 12.6 
It is interesting to note that none of the 
partners reported that the budget could be met by 
reporting all chargeable time, yet, a larger per-
centage of them, as compared to the other posi-
tions, felt the budget could be met very often by 
reporting all chargeable hours. None of the staff 
felt the budget could be met very often by re-
porting all of their chargeable time. 
Ethical Positions on Underreporting 
Although accounting textbooks and 
Partner Manager Senior Staff 
0 1.5 5.6 6.3 
13.1 11.8 13 25 
28.6 39.7 37 31.3 
39.3 35.3 37 37.5 
19 11.8 7.4 0 
ethical perception of underreporting does not 
have a big impact on behavior. 
Superiors' Influence on Underreporting 
One of the biggest potential contributors 
to the underreporting of time is the explicit and 
implicit requests of the accountant's superior. 
Table 6 reports the respondents' responses to the 
frequency of requests to underreport time by su-
periors. The findings show that implicit requests 
are more frequent than explicit requests. Almost 
Table 5 
A b h h d h· at ccountants perceptIon a out w et er un erre [lortmg tIme IS et IC 
Percentage responding Partner Manager Senior Staff 
Ethical position 
Strongly approve .9 % 2.4 0 0 0 
Approve 4 3.6 2.9 5.5 6.3 
Indifferent 29.1 21.7 27.9 38.2 43.8 
Disapprove 44.8 47 41.2 45.5 50 
Strongly disapprove 2l.l 25.3 27.9 10.9 0 
16 
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92 % of the respondents stated that they had 
never been explicitly requested to underreport 
time while approximately 76 % stated that they 
had never received any implicit request to under-
report time. Although few accountants are di-
rectly told to underreport time, which would 
violate many firms' policies, the findings show 
there are more implied requests. An argument 
can be made that such implicit requests create 
more pressur\ for subordinates than explicit re-
quests because the subordinate must decide 
whether or not to report all chargeable hours. 
Perceived Rewards from Underreponing 
Table 7 provides the responses to the 
likelihood that underreporting could lead to vari-
ous rewards. The results show that the three 
primary rewards are better periodic evaluation, 
superiors' perception of competency and promo-
tion and advancement. Participants also indicated 
that the underreporting of time did not contribute 
to their personal growth and that it led to job dis-
satisfaction and negative feelings about them-
selves. 
Table 8 shows the responses, by posi-
tion, for the probability (very or somewhat 
likely) that underreporting will lead to reward. 
The findings show that staff personnel believe 
underreporting chargeable hours leads to better 
periodic performance evaluations, enhances su-
periors' perception of competency and results in 
more interesting and challenging assignments. 
Volume 15, Number 1 
The results suggest that both seniors and staff 
believe underreporting time helps with promo-
tion and advancement. It is interesting to note 
that partners, as compared to managers, seniors 
and staff, believe underreporting contributes to 
personal growth and development, provides a 
sense of accomplishment and enhances job satis-
faction. 
Recommendations to Reduce Underreporting 
Although most public accounting firms 
have written policies that prohibit "eating" time, 
the results of this study show that underreporting 
time is still a problem. Four specific recommen-
dations to reduce or deter underreporting 
chargeable time include: 1) recognition of the 
problem; 2) management leadership; 3) training 
and evaluation controls; 4) reevaluation of budg-
eting process. Management of public accounting 
firms needs to admit that underreporting charge-
able hours affects the firm's primary asset-the 
individual accountant. Anecdotal evidence indi-
cates that firms may not want to admit that un-
derreporting is occurring. During the prelimi-
nary stages of this project one of the authors ap-
proached a partner of a Big Six firm to see if his 
firm would be willing to participate in the study. 
He indicated that his firm was reluctant to par-
ticipate because the distribution of the question-
naire would imply that underreporting was oc-
curring and his firm has policies that prohibits 
underreporting chargeable hours. Management 
must recognize that underreporting chargeable 
Table 6 
s d uperiors' request to un erreport time 
Percentage Partner Manager Senior Staff 
Type and frequency of request respondinR 
Explicit requests 
Yes, frequently .5 % 1.3 0 0 0 
Yes, infrequently 7.8 3.8 10.3 10.9 6.3 
No, never 91.7 94.9 89.7 89.1 93.8 
Implicit requests 
Yes, frequently 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.9 0 
Yes, occasionally 22.2 6.4 26.5 37 31.3 
No, never 76.4 92.3 72.1 61.1 68.8 
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Table 7 
Accountants' perceived reward from underreporting chargeable time 
L'k l"h d Th U d Lad]', R d I e I 00 at n erreportmg e s 0 ewa,; 
Perceived Reward Very likely 
Better periodic performance 15.8 
evaluation 
Superiors think you are as com- 14.5 
petent or more competent than 
others at your level 
Feeling more s~cure about your 8.1 
job with the firm 
Promotion and advancement 10.9 
Assignments to jobs that are more 6.8 
interesting and challenging 
Feeling of pride in meeting time 6.3 
budgets for most engagements 
Feeling that you have contributed 2.3 
to your personal growth and de-
velopment 
Feeling that you are as competent 4.5 
as others at your level 
Feeling that you have accom- 4.1 
plished something worthwhile 
Feeling of job satisfaction 3.2 
Feeling better about yourself as a 2.3 
person 
time is occurring. 
In addition to written policies and pro-
cedures management needs to set the tone that 
underreporting will not be tolerated. Since the 
results of this study show that partners also un-
derreport time, these individuals will have to al-
ter their own behavior in order to lead by exam-
ple. The tone set by management will impact the 
behavior of the other accountants in the office. 
For example, one of the authors, who previously 
worked for a Big Six firm, was told by a man-
aging partner that budgeted goals must be met to 
get promoted even if that meant eating time. 
While the findings of this study do not suggest 
that such explicit requests are a problem, the 
frequency of implicit requests indicates a prob-
Somewhat Unsure Somewhat Very 
18 
likely unlikely unlikely 
43.9 9 17.2 14 
43 10.9 18.1 13.6 
21.7 23.1 27.1 19.9 
32.6 19 19.9 17.6 
27.1 24 21.3 20.8 
30.2 14.9 22.1 26.6 
13.1 14.9 34.2 35.6 
18.5 18 32.4 26.6 
14 15.8 34.2 32 
11.3 17.6 30.2 37.8 
7.7 17.1 28.8 44.1 
lem. Written policies and procedures will have 
little meaning for managers, seniors and staff if 
partners do not adhere to such policies. 
The firms should address this issue in 
the initial training of new accountants. The mes-
sage should be very clear that underreporting 
chargeable time will not be tolerated. To illus-
trate the importance of the issue, firms should 
modify the evaluation process (i. e. include a 
question about underreporting time in the 
evaluation form) and establish clear and severe 
penalties for underreporting chargeable hours 
(Le. termination, reimbursement to firm for un-
derreported hours). Modifications to initial 
training and the evaluation process will not be 
effective unless the partners and managers en-
Copyright © 1998. All rights reserved.
The Journal of Applied Business Research 
force the penalties. 
Firms also need to reevaluate the budg-
eting process. The findings of this study show 
that half of the respondents felt they could not 
meet budget regularly (or very often) by report-
ing all chargeable hours. Since the budgets do 
not appear to be realistic, firms apparently are 
using ideal, rather than practical, budgets. If the 
budgets that are used for evaluation and planning 
purposes are not realistic, firms are creating an 
environment that will result in some underre-
porting of chargeable hours. 
Conclusions 
Although most public accounting firms 
have policies that prohibit underreporting 
chargeable hours, the findings of this study show 
that accountants at all levels still "eat" time. 
While the majority (65.9%) of the respondents 
believes underreporting chargeable time is un-
ethical, the majority (71 %) does not report all 
chargeable hours. This contradictory behavior 
appears to stem from the desire to: 1) receive 
better periodic performance evaluations, 2) be 
viewed as "competent" by superiors and 3) re-
ceive promotion and advancement. The respon-
dents also indicated that underreporting time did 
not contribute to their personal growth and that it 
led to job dissatisfaction and negative feelings 
about themselves. 
Three possible explanations as to why 
public accounting firms continue to tolerate un-
derreporting chargeable time include: 1) CPA 
firms do not believe this is a problem because 
policies and procedures prohibit such behavior; 
2) competition for clients forces firms to keep 
rates low and 3) firms actually benefit because 
most fee arrangements are fixed. Underreport-
ing time, however, is a problem that affects both 
the individual accountant and the firm. While it 
is difficult to measure the impact on either the 
individual accountant (i. e. morale, productivity) 
or the firm (i.e. inefficiencies, turnover) under-
reporting chargeable hours is a management is-
19 
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sue that the partners need to address in order to 
efficiently use and maintain the most precious 
asset (human capital) of the firm. Partners must 
first recognize and admit that the problem exists 
at all levels before effective policies can be im-
plemented. The partners' need to set the tone and 
lead by example. We suggest that firms revise 
their initial training, evaluation and budgeting 
processes. Severe penalties should be estab-
lished and enforced. If new policies are not en-
forced, accountants will continue to underreport 
chargeable hours. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
The limited research on underreporting 
time has utilized a survey approach to identify 
the levels (positions) that underreport time and 
the possible reasons for "eating" time. Such re-
search has not answered two important ques-
tions: 1) why does this activity continue to oc-
cur? and 2) what type of individual is likely to 
underreport time? Future research should utilize 
a field study, consisting of interviews with pro-
fessional at all levels, to determine "why" public 
accounting firms allow accountants to continue 
to underreport time. We also suggest that future 
research should try to identify characteristics that 
differentiate the professionals who eat time from 
those who report all of their chargeable time. 
An understanding of the type of individual that 
might "eat" time should help partners and man-
agers to more effectively address this issue. W 
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44.5 65.6 69.1 81.3 
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